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Introduction
This occasion marks the first time that a law review in the United
States holds a second symposium devoted to sexual orientation and the
law.' It also marks the first time that a law review in the United States
devotes a symposium specifically to sexual orientation and issues of
"intersectionality." 2  This Symposium therefore is a milestone: it
represents two first-ever events, both of which are crucial to the
continuing quest for sexual orientation justice in the United States.
This quest is vibrant and viable, as the scholarship produced
between the first symposium and this one can attest.3 The prolific
1. The first symposium was Sexual Preference and Gender Identity: A Symposium, 30
HASTINGs L.J. 799 (1979).
2. The term refers to the interplay of multiple forms of social or legal bias, such as the
combination of racism and sexism, and to the recognition that such biases operate on multiple
axes simultaneously. Thus, the subordination of women of color results from the combined
operation of racism and sexism. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U.
CHI. L. FORUM 139; see also infra notes 117-44 and accompanying text (discussing different
forms of intersectionality in social analysis, legal analysis, and anti-discrimination case law).
3. The origins of this scholarship are surveyed in Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies,
Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender" and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 31 n.83 (1995)
[hereinafter Valdes, Queers].
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discourse that has emerged since the 1979 symposium is described below,
perhaps somewhat simplistically, as the "first stage" of sexual orientation
scholarship to denote the evolutionary nature of critical knowledge and
scholarly consciousness. 4  The issues engaged-or deferred-during this
first stage in turn pose and frame the challenges that await the "second
stage" of sexual orientation scholarship. Today, with this Symposium,
we stand at the cusp of this second stage. This moment provides an
opportune occasion to reflect both on the accomplishments registered by
our first-stage efforts and on the challenges that await our second-stage
efforts.
First-stage accomplishments of course include the very inception, at
the 1979 symposium, and then the subsequent establishment, of a strong
legal discourse that never before existed in this country. That discourse
minted knowledge that exposed some of the injustices inherent in
heterosexist prejudice. That knowledge problematized heterosexist
hegemony and nurtured legal and social objection to its continuation.
Perhaps first-stage efforts even emboldened ongoing activist struggles
against sexual tyranny.5
Among the challenges awaiting a second stage of sexual orientation
theorizing-sometimes described in this Essay as "Queer" legal theory 6-
is a similarly powerful and empowering engagement of race and
4. See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text (discussing developmental aspects of the
issues addressed in this Essay).
5. For an excellent recent history of sexual minorities in the United States, see JOHN
D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
MiNORrrY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); see generally Valdes, Queers, supra
note 3, at 59-61 n. 154 (recounting the early history of sexual minority resistance of heterosexist
oppression). Sexual minority activism no doubt was fueled during this time by the onset of the
HIV pandemic and by the government's apparent indifference to its devastation of gay male and
other vulnerable communities. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS,
PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987).
6. The term "Queer" remains controversial because it evokes the specter of a heterosexist
regime of terror. As reclaimed and deployed in recent years, the term also signifies a prideful,
iconoclastic, and egalitarian political stance toward all forms of subordination. Of course,
professing or invoking a sensibility is not tantamount to honoring or practicing it, and "Queer"
activism at times has suffered a gap between ideals and practices. For a discussion of the term
"Queer" and its relationship to critical legal theory, see Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 344-
77. In this Essay, "Queer" legal theory is employed occasionally to describe a second stage of
sexual orientation scholarship that manifests in a critical manner the substantive anti-
subordination values of "Queer" ideals; in this Essay, "Queer" legal theory sometimes is used
to describe the sort of scholarship that second-stage theorizing could and should henceforth
generate. See infra notes 59-64 and 99-113 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of
"Queer" as opposed to "gay and lesbian" scholarship and discourse).
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ethnicity, or, more precisely, an engagement of the interplay of racism
and ethnocentrism in the formation of "sexual orientation" identity,
community, and subordination-a critical investigation of the ways in
which white and straight supremacy interlock to create social and legal
conditions that permit or encourage the practice of permutated bigotries
against the multiply diverse sexual minorities7 of the United States. This
pending engagement calls for, and entails, a collective and mutual move
by the community of sexual orientation scholars that has formed since
1979.
It bears emphasis at the outset that this Essay's focus on these two
constructs is not intended-though it may nonetheless seem-to privilege
race and ethnicity in second-stage scholarship over other constructs that
social and legal experience suggest cross-intersect with sexual orientation
and with each other to structure and sustain the oppression of diverse
sexual minorities. This focus additionally may tend to reify constructs,
phenomena, or classifications in limited or underinclusive ways. 8 Thus,
at the outset, I encourage all rejoinders to this Essay's focus on color as
part of a developing body of anti-subordination scholarship; hopefully,
this Essay will prove to be but a prelude to further dialogue on the
complexities that cause and texture the subordination of lesbians, gay
men, bisexuals, transsexuals, and the trans/bi-gendered of all colors,
classes, creeds, sexes, genders, locations, and abilities.9 This Essay
therefore invites and celebrates further, widescale scholarly engagement
of various sources and permutations of "sexual orientation" oppression.
In brief, I argue here that it is urgent, and both substantively and
strategically imperative, for critical legal scholars who choose to write
7. The term "sexual minorities" is employed in this Essay to describe inclusively
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals, and the trans/bi-gendered. This descriptor does not
imply that persons in each of these populations is "the same" to others within or across these
groups; this descriptor simply acknowledges that each of these "sexual minority" populations is
perceived as aberrational under traditional heteropatriarchal ideology and therefore is
subordinated through the interplay of sex, gender, and sexuality in Euro-American cultures.
See Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 8 n.16, 248-75.
8. See generally Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2
AFR. AM. L. & PoL'Y REP. 207 (1995) (observing the complexities of "identity" and of its
analysis as a legal and social construct).
9. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Beyond Analogy, Toward Synergy: Rethinking Race and
Sexual Orientation in Equal Protection Analysis and Anti-Subordination Theory, 75 DENV. U.
L. REv. _ (forthcoming 1998) (elaborating a comparative analysis of "status" and "conduct"
in race and sexual orientation equality contexts).
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from a lesbian, gay, or bisexual subject position' ° to interrogate the
racialized and ethnicized dynamics of sexual orientation identities and
issues as part of an evolving anti-subordination discourse. I argue that
this collective engagement is not only warranted but necessary because it
is the "right" move substantively and strategically due to known facts
regarding the diversity of sexual minority communities as well as to
learned lessons taught by outsider jurisprudence11 in recent years.
Otherwise, as the emergent racial critique of extant sexual orientation
legal discourse suggests, 2 the forms and functions of our scholarship will
10. The term "subject position" as employed in this Essay refers to the perspective or
standpoint of the author regarding the topic of analysis. See Robert S. Chang, The End of
Innocence or Politics After the Fall of the Essential Subject, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 687, 690-91
(1996).
11. The term "outsider jurisprudence" as employed in this Essay refers to the critical
literature and discourses created in recent years by "minority" or outsider legal scholars. See
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989) (coining the term).
12. The absence of intersectional analysis in lesbian and gay legal discourse has drawn
increasing critical attention from sexual minority scholars of color during the past few years.
Indeed, this internal racial critique, as expressed in its written form within the law review
literature of the United States, seems to have originated in the past three years. The term
"internal racial critique" as employed in this Essay thus refers to the growing body of work
critiquing the absence of intersectionality in first-stage sexual orientation legal scholarship; this
critique is "internal" because it emanates from authors who explicitly write from a sexual
minority subject position and it is "racial" because it oftentimes, though not exclusively,
critiques the specific absence of race from "sexual orientation" analyses. See, e.g., Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and
Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REv. 561 (1997) (analyzing the relevance of race and class to
lesbian and gay politics and legal discourse); see also Isabelle R. Gunning, Stories from Home:
Tales from the Intersection of Race, Gender and Sexual Orientation, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 143 (1995) (recounting personal and general encounters with Eurocentrism in
lesbian venues or discourses); Cynthia Petersen, Envisioning a Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence,
in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 118 (Didi Herman &
Carl Stychin eds., 1995) [hereinafter LEGAL INVERSIONS] (arguing that lesbian legal theory
must be intersectional because lesbian subordination is multifaceted); Darren Rosenblum, Queer
Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories, " 4 LAW & SExuALrry
83 (1994) (questioning the benefits of lesbian and gay liberation to lesbians and gays who are of
color, and/or poor, and/or trans/bi-gendered). Similar critiques aimed at court opinions or
focused on class and other intersections also have begun to emerge in recent years. See, e.g.,
Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodifted: Speculation on Law's Discourse, Race and the
Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVERSIONS, supra, at 47 (arguing that the omission
of intersectional analyses in sexual orientation anti-discrimination cases effectively codes sexual
orientation as white and race as heterosexual); Eric Heinze, Gay and Poor, 38 How. L.J. 433
(1995) (noting how poverty can affect "gay cases" as well as "non-gay cases" brought by gay
people); Ruthann Robson, To Market, To Market: Considering Class in the Context of Lesbian
Legal Theories and Reforms, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173 (1995) (discussing the
interplay of class and sexual orientation in lesbian legal theorizing). Gays and lesbians of color
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suffer an increasing irrelevance to "our" communities-an irrelevance
resulting from neglect of the legal experience and social conditions that
oppress racially and ethnically diverse sexual minorities. Such neglect
incrementally but steadily may diminish the substantive insight and
efficacy of our theorizing; such neglect over time may undermine the
transformative potential of our work.
This engagement, I thus argue, is mandated both by the accrual of
substantive and strategic benefits as well as by the avoidance of
substantive and strategic costs at a key juncture in the development of
sexual orientation legal scholarship. My hope is that this Symposium,
like the first one, effectively will mark the opening of a new era in the
continuing enrichment and development of sexual orientation theorizing,
especially regarding race and ethnicity. Advancing this hope is the main
aim of this Essay.
In so doing, I seek also to advance a longstanding aim: to nudge
greater mutual interaction between and among existing legal discourses of
outsider and progressive critical scholars on mutually-reinforcing sources
or structures of privilege and subordination. 13  Although each of the
several genres of contemporary outsider jurisprudence has proven
powerful and enriching in its own right, they sometimes tend to limit
their analytical and transformative potential by a common disinclination
to carry their examination of subordination beyond their primary self-
ascribed domains.14 Yet the work of outsider scholars has made it
increasingly plain that all forms of social and legal oppression are
multifaceted, because all forms of identity and identification are
multiplicitious and multidimensional; 5 this point, in fact, is the thrust of
have advanced similar points about sexual diversities in non-legal discourse. See, e.g., Valdes,
Queers, supra note 3, at 359 n.1266.
13. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 358-59, 372-75 (urging collaborative projects and
agendas between Queer, feminist, and critical race legal theorists).
14. See generally Francisco Valdes, Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-
Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J.
1 (1996) [hereinafter Valdes, Latinalo] (describing the failure of various outsider discourses to
interconnect and urging the benefits of mutual and collaborative interconnection). Compare
Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(articulating the interconnectedness of straight and white privilege from a black male
heterosexual position).
15. The multidimensionality of subordination through law has been articulated in recent
years by various scholars of color. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (demonstrating the multiplicity of all
social and legal identities with the example of race and gender); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric, and
Replacement, 25 CoLUm. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 369 (1994) [hereinafter Hernandez-Truyol,
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the emergent internal critique. 16  The intersectionalities created by the
multiplicity of all human identifies thus challenge critical legal analysts of
all stripes to produce increasingly nuanced works that unpack the
consequences of diversity and difference within and across social or legal
hierarchies.17  Accordingly, this Essay urges the importance of
intersectional expansion within Queer legal theory as part of a larger
move toward connection between and among legal anti-subordination
discourses.
But the importance of this move to connect is not limited to the
critical insights that mutual exchange can accrue. Intersectional analyses
and projects are valuable to sexual minorities, racial and ethnic
minorities, and other subordinated groups because they can enhance our
joint capacity to understand the interconnectedness of multifaceted power
systems that stand on intersected axes of privilege. And a better
understanding of interlocked subordination systems can produce a greater
joint capacity to unpack and dismantle them. As a practical matter, the
Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads] (discussing the demographic
multidimensionality of identity in Latina/o contexts); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol,
Building Bridges: Bringing International Human Rights Home, 9 LA RAzA L.J. 69, 71 (1996)
(urging multidimensionality as critical legal method in race and ethnicity legal discourses);
Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 636-44 (urging the creation of a multidimensional lesbian and gay
legal discourse as an extension of intersectionality); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the
Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997) (proposing cosynthesis as a post-
intersectionality method of analysis); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture:
Ruminations on Identities and Interconnectivities, 5 SO. CAL. REv. L. WOMEN'S STUD. 25
(1995) [hereinafter Valdes, Sex and Race] (proposing interconnectivity as a complement to
intersectionality and related concepts).
16. Not surprisingly, then, the methods, lessons, and trajectories forged in outsider
jurisprudence inform the emergent internal critique of sexual orientation discourse. Of course,
engagement of this emergent racial critique necessitates familiarity with and understanding of
the critique's jurisprudential underpinnings. Thus, to conduct responsibly the internal second-
stage conversation started by the emergent racial critique requires a collective engagement of
outsider scholarship on race and ethnicity, which has developed alongside first-generation
sexual orientation scholarship. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 638-40 (pointing to
critical race and feminist legal theory as sources of intersectional and multidimensional analyses
for future lesbian and gay theorizing).
17. This observation of course implicates the sameness/difference discourse, which in
recent years has examined from varied subject positions how complex and multidimensional
categories of social or legal identity overlap or cross-relate. See generally MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); see
also Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 877 (1992); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference
It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical
Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
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interconnection of power and privilege across multiple sources and
categories makes it incumbent on outsider legal scholars interested in
material transformation to learn about, and respond critically to, those
interconnections.
In fact, the development of common understandings and parallel
movements to connect otherwise disparate anti-subordination struggles
can be a key contribution specifically of outsider legal scholars toward
the design and creation of an egalitarian post-subordination order through
critical legal theory. But to do so we must learn about various critical
perspectives, jurisprudential movements and historical experiences. We
must involve ourselves with-and nurture the involvement of others in-
communities or discourses that otherwise might be seen attenuated from
or unconnected to each other. The point is to learn continually and
critically from each "other" to better understand and resist the systems of
supremacy that combine to produce the relative social and legal positions
of all humans.
Though I devote the bulk of this Essay to the positive and negative
reasons that compel an end to the first-stage silence on race and ethnicity
within a second stage of sexual orientation discourse, I note now and
again toward the end of this Essay, 18 as I have noted previously, 19 that the
same reasons and points apply to corresponding silences within race and
ethnicity legal discourses regarding sexual orientation; the same points
and reasons elaborated below about first-stage sexual orientation legal
scholarship apply to race legal scholarship. The imperative of
engagement is mutual because the intersection of race, ethnicity, and
sexual orientation marks the intersection of outsider jurisprudence and
second-stage sexual orientation scholarship. The intersection of race,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation marks a ready site of mutual exchange
and jurisprudential convergence toward self-empowerment through legal
theorizing.
Part I opens with a general overview of the sexual orientation
scholarly status quo, both in legal doctrine and theory, as it has
developed in the years since the 1979 symposium. Part II considers some
pending issues raised for Queer legal theory by the first-stage record and
18. See infra note 115 and accompanying text (calling for a reciprocal and mutual
engagement of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation).
19. See Valdes, Latina/o, supra note 14, at 5-7 (addressing the general failure of critical
race theory to adequately account for minority sexual orientations and for non-black people of
color in its anti-subordination analyses and agenda).
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by the emerging internal critique of it, stemming chiefly from the
inattention of legal discourse to the interaction of race, ethnicity, and
sexual orientation. This discussion urges not only collective engagement
but also adoption and promotion of an ethic of caring, mutual recognition
within and through Queer theorizing. Part III concludes the Essay with a
comparison of intersectionality's triumphs and failures in various contexts
to note its likely failure in cases involving race, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation. This closing section urges the cultivation of intersectionality
in Queer legal theory to uncover the social interaction of race and
ethnicity in sexual orientation oppression while qualifying the prospects
of its legal application under existing doctrinal conditions. These three
parts jointly strive to help orient the further development of Queer legal
theory during the second stage of sexual orientation legal scholarship-a
stage effectively signaled by this Symposium.
I. The "Sexual Orientation" Anti-Discrimination Status Quo: A
Survey
Since the 1979 symposium, and especially during the past ten years,
a rich and growing body of legal scholarship on sexual orientation has
emerged to help combat the oppression of sexual minorities in varied
walks of contemporary life.' This literature has intervened in key life
venues, including barriers against the employment and housing of our
communities. It has marshaled common law, statutory law, and
constitutional law on behalf of those communities. It has invoked state
and local law, as well as federal law, to advance these broad anti-
discrimination aims. It has, in short, embarked on a widescale attack
against the many forms of discrimination that are integral to the
structuring of life and law in the United States along sexual orientation
fault lines.
A. Privacy, Equality, and Family: A Doctrinal Sketch
Doctrinally, the first-stage attack against sexual orientation
discrimination has focused on three general areas. The first has been
privacy law. The second has been equality law. The third has been
20. For a fairly comprehensive bibliography of this literature, see Standing Comm. on
Lesbian and Gay Issues of the Social Responsibilities Special Interest Section of the Am. Assoc.
Law Libraries, Sexual Orientation and the Law: A Selective Bibliography on Homosexuality and
the Law, 1969-1993, 86 LAw LEBR. J. 1 (1994).
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family law. This trio represents vast domains of law and life, and thus
suggests the ambitious legal and political nature of first-stage efforts.
Privacy figures prominently in the development of sexual minority
anti-discrimination efforts because the trajectory of doctrinal
developments seemed promising during the formative years of sexual
orientation scholarship. Judicial articulation of modem privacy principles
beginning during the 1960s seemed to suggest that constitutional
safeguarding of consensual intimacy applied equally to procreational and
recreational activity.21 A strict insistence on procreational purpose in all
acts of consensual intimacy having been rejected as a constitutional litmus
test in Griswold v. Connecticut,'2 Eisenstadt v. Baird,' and Carey v.
Population Services,24 there seemed to be no principled reason to
distinguish same-sex from cross-sex recreational intimacy. The Eleventh
Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers effectively read that way the privacy line
of cases preceding it.' The Supreme Court vehemently disagreed in
Bowers v. Hardwick.26
Emphasizing-and exploiting-the language in its privacy precedents
about marriage as "an association that promotes a way of life,"27 the
Supreme Court in Bowers called a halt to privacy when it involved the
consensual coupling of two male adults because, the Court summarily
asserted, it was "evident that none of the rights announced in [prior
privacy] cases bears any resemblance" to same-sex intimacy and
connection." That conclusory assertion was made possible precisely
because the prior privacy rulings had combined ambivalently the
deregulation of sexual expression with a continued validation of the forms
and values associated with traditional heteropatriarchal ideology: while
striking down state regulation of "private" consensual cross-sex intimacy
21. Despite the relatively "liberal" results of those cases, the Court's reasoning was
considerably traditionalist, reflecting a continued attachment to heteropatriarchal ideology. See
Francisco Valdes, Acts of Power, Crimes of Knowledge: Some Thoughts on Desire, Law and
Ideology in the Politics of Erpression at the Turn of a Century, 1 IOWA J. RACE, GENDER &
JUSTICE 213 (1997) (critiquing the ideological instrumentality of modem privacy jurisprudence
and its suppressive tendencies).
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down an anti-contraception statute as applied to a
married couple).
23. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold's right of privacy to sexual activity in
unmarried, cross-sex couplings).
24. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extending Griswold and Eisenstadt to minors).
25. 760 F.2d 1202 (lth Cir. 1985) (reviewing the pre-Bowers rulings).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
27. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
28. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
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that was recreational, the Court continued to extol the primacy of
procreational standards and heteropatriarchal structures in constitutional
law and analysis.29 This ambivalence produced "liberal" results but
continued traditionalist state ideology toward the regulation of sexual
expression.3 °
The mixed pre-Bowers record thus had created a doctrinal
environment fairly vulnerable to manipulation: the doctrinal status quo at
the time of Bowers permitted any court to emphasize and embrace at will
either the reformist or the traditionalist features of modem privacy
jurisprudence. The Bowers Court simply chose to exercise its supreme
discretion to pursue and bolster the latter, but it did so with
rationalizations flimsy enough to spark a veritable flood of scholarly
skepticism. 31 Thus, a body of legal scholarship devoted to exposing and
critiquing the heterosexist premises and objectives of the Bowers privacy
flat burst into existence within a few years.32
With the privacy path summarily shut by Bowers, political activists
and legal scholars searched for new avenues toward the recognition and
protection of same-sex rights, and this search for alternatives continued to
prioritize constitutional planes of attack against homophobic exercises of
29. See Valdes, supra note 21, at 230-37 (discussing the ambivalent combination of reform
and tradition in modem privacy law).
30. Id. For further readings on modem privacy law, see infra notes 31 and 32 and
authorities cited therein.
31. Various commentators have come to the conclusion that the majority opinion in
Bowers was driven by "personal predilection" or "hidden determinants" rather than by sound
legal analysis and impartial judicial reasoning. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick:
Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648 (1987); Anne B. Goldstein,
History, Homosexuality and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers
v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988). Justice Powell, who cast the deciding vote that
created the 5-4 majority for the Bowers ruling, later publicly acknowledged "I probably made a
mistake in that one.... When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few months [after
the ruling], I thought the dissent had the better arguments." Powell's statement was offered in
response to a question at a student forum at New York University, where he was asked whether
he thought he had made any mistakes while on the Court. See Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice
Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3.
32. See, e.g., supra note 31 and authorities cited therein critiquing the Bowers opinion;
see also Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431 (1992);
Steven J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23
CONN. L. REv. 861 (1991); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1989); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REv. 773 (1988); Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick
and the Legitimization of Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 829 (1987); Yao Apasu-
Gbotsu, et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521 (1986).
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state power. In light of the gains recorded during the immediately
preceding years by the varied legal and political strategies of the civil
rights33 and women's liberation34 movements, the obvious candidates for
a second route to sexual orientation social justice were in/equality politics
and equal protection law. The next wave of activism and scholarship
therefore focused on equality goals and jurisprudence. Mounting a
determined effort to demonstrate the illegitimacy of sexual orientation
inequality in conventional equal protection terms, sexual minority
advocates and scholars advanced claims and analyses that took seriously
constitutional equal protection principles. 5
But the courts would have none-or little-of it. Rather than meet
these efforts on the merits, courts typically asserted that substantive
equality analyses effectively were precluded, or the results preordained,
by Bowers' privacy ruling. This conclusion originated in and is
exemplified by the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Padula v. Webster, where the
court asserted that "there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal."36
In other words, because the Bowers Court's privacy ruling upheld the
constitutionality of sodomy statutes as applied to a same-sex coupling,
and because the Padula court supposed that sodomy was "the conduct
that defines" lesbians and gay men, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
Padula, a "practicing" lesbian,37 could not claim the equal protection of
the law. After Padula, a series of federal rulings repeated its
status/conduct approach, oftentimes in the context of the military's anti-
33. For a general history of the strategies that accompanied the civil rights movement, see
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950 (1989).
34. For a general history of the strategy behind the Equal Rights Amendment, see
DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF
ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION (1990).
35. See generally Elvia R. Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual
Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 143 (1988); Janet E.
Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989); John Charles Hays, Note, The Tradition of Prejudice
Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REv. 375 (1990).
36. 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
37. Margaret Padula is described in the court's opinion as a "practicing homosexual." Id.
at 99. This fact and its use in the Padula analysis of course raises questions about the
relationship of "sodomy" to lesbian status or identity, questions that are beyond the scope of
this Essay.
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gay exclusion policy.38 The worthiness of sexual minority equality claims
thus was judicially declared foreclosed, or at least fatally prejudiced, by
Bowers' privacy ruling.
The stonewalling of sexual minority equal protection claims by an
increasingly conservatized federal judiciary 9 redirected sexual minority
initiatives toward state, as well as federal, venues and sources of law.'
In federal contexts, the First Amendment began to receive newfound
attention.41 At the same time, both equality42 and privacy43 claims were
38. This line of equality cases thus also largely defines the courts' reaction to the
monumental struggle over sexual minority access to military service, which continues more or
less fitfully. See generally Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the
Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHT. L. REV. 381 (1994) (critically
reviewing the cases); see also Janine M. Dascenzo & Neal A. May, Comment, Cleaning Out
the Pentagon's Closet: An Overview of the Defense Department's Anti-Gay Policy, 23 U. TOL.
L. REV. 433 (1992); Kurt D. Hermansen, Comment, Analyzing the Military's Justifications for
its Exclusionary Policy: Fifty Years Withot a Rational Basis, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151
(1992); Judith Hicks Stiehm, Comment, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy:
Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1992). See generally infra note 54 and authorities
cited therein on statuslconduct issues.
39. Though political affinity historically influenced judicial appointments to varying
degrees, the administrations of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush systematically
employed political ideology to consciously cause a jurisprudential counter-revolution that would
roll back the civil rights gains of the 1960s. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial
Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989); David W.
Rohde & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideologgy, Strategy and Supreme Court Decisions: William
Rehnquist as Chief Justice, 72 JUDICATURE 247 (1989). The appointments of the past two
decades have effectively reconstituted the federal judiciary, making it more hostile to anti-
subordination claims. See, e.g., William B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment
Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1485 (1990) (addressing the Court's doctrinal civil rights retrenchment in its 1989 term); Nancy
Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraints and the Manipulation of
Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (1989) (critiquing the deployment of jurisdictional
and prudential barriers to deflect civil rights claims); Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule
for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 MO. L. REV. 677 (1984)
(analyzing the relative strictness of federal courts in analyzing the sufficiency of civil rights
complaints). See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992) (describing the jurisprudential politics of the present-day
Court).
40. See, e.g., Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a
More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723 (1991); Paula A. Brantner, Note,
Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination: State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy
Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495 (1992). Of course, state and local lawmaking power
also provides opportunities to maintain heterosexist supremacy. See generally infra note 45 and
authorities cited therein on the use of state referenda to enact statutory or constitutional
measures designed to stymie sexual orientation equality.
41. See, e.g., David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 319 (1994); William B. Rubenstein, Since When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route
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pressed under state constitutional schemes, or under state and local laws.
This expanded yet regionalized anti-discrimination drive also produced
momentum to enact state and local protective laws where none previously
existed, which in turn helped to generate the politics of "cultural war"
and majoritarian backlash" that, for now, still sway the land."
The expansion from constitutional and federal planes to state and
local efforts was accompanied by a newfound emphasis on the basics of
everyday life-family arrangements and housing issues.46 No doubt, this
to Equality?: Some Reflections on the Construction of the Hate Speech Debate from a
Lesbian/Gay Perspective, 2 LAw & SEXUALITY 19 (1992); Katie Watson, Note, An Alternative
Ito Privacy: The First Amendment Right of Intimate Association, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 891 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (challenging the state's same-sex
marriage ban under the state constitution's equal protection clause); see also Barbara J. Cox,
Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Many in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When
We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1033.
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (1992) (challenging the state's
sodomy statute under the state constitution's privacy guarantees); see also Special Feature:
Commonwealth v. Wasson: Invalidating Kentucky's Sodomy Statute, 81 KY. L.J. 423 (1992-
1993).
44. Cultural war against sexual minorities and other subordinated groups was declared by
Republican presidential hopeful Patrick J. Buchanan from the podium of the 1992 Republican
Convention. The purpose of cultural war is to reclaim public policy for the maintenance of
traditional social arrangements and power hierarchies. See Paul Galloway, Divided We Stand:
Today's "Cultural War" Goes Deeper than Political Slogans, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at Cl
(reporting Buchanan's speech and related events); see also Keith Aoki, Foreword: The
Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1467 (1996)
(discussing the political climate of backlash and the development of critical legal scholarship in
Asian American contexts); see generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
45. See generally Symposium, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives, 55
OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994); Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1905 (1993); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for
Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153 (1993). This use of state referenda to
stymie sexual minority equality claims or gains eventually produced the Supreme Court's ruling
in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (striking down on equal protection
grounds Colorado's Amendment Two, which had amended via referendum the state constitution
to prohibit any state entity from enacting any sexual orientation anti-discrimination policies);
see also Colloquium, Romer v. Evans: The Decision and Its Impact, 2 NAT'L J. SEX. ORIENT.
L. 1 (1996) <http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw> (this journal is the nation's first on-line law
journal); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993) (providing a constitutional
analysis by the Senior Judge of the Oregon Supreme Court of the mis/use of majoritarian
politics to formalize sexual orientation discrimination).
46. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW
& SEXUALITY 97 (1991); Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family
Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(1986); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but
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emphasis coincided with and was facilitated by the increasing visibility of
sexual minority couplings and communities in social terms. 47 The third
doctrinal focus, concentrated on state or local regulation of family and
residential arrangements, therefore arose.
Generally, this litigation and scholarship trained on states'
discriminatory regulation of family life, questioning and resisting the
heteropatriarchal premises and biases of the status quo to secure the
integrity of same-sex unions and families.48 This struggle centered not
only on formal marriage equities but also on related issues: the
establishment and recognition of domestic partnerships; the protection of
same-sex procreation, custody of offspring, or adoption of children; the
control of medical care for partners or loved ones; and the retention or
disposition of property rights upon the demise of a partner.49 These anti-
discrimination fronts effectively covered the gamut of family life. This
aspect of the first-wave attack on heterosexist hegemony over family
relations therefore was as legally broad and politically ambitious as the
constitutional claims to privacy and equality.
This account, in its brevity, of course oversimplifies the first-stage
development of sexual minority anti-discrimination politics and
scholarship. The status quo produced during these first-stage efforts in
each of these three general doctrinal arenas therefore varies in manifold
particulars. In each instance the struggle against social ignorance and
legal prejudice has posted important gains, yet remains unfinished.
Indeed, the gains posted have excited a politics of backlash and
retrenchment even as they have helped to ameliorate sexual orientation
injustice. This survey therefore is intended to provide a general and
Not Hell Either, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1107 (1996); Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex
"Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-
Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (1997); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990); Ruthann Robson & S.E.
Valentine, Lov(H)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMPLE L.
REy. 511 (1990); John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal
for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415 (1991).
47. See, e.g., D'EMtLIO, supra note 5, at 9-219 (recounting the emergence of visible and
vibrant sexual minority enclaves in various metropolitan centers of the United States during the
second half of this century); see also ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS, 1945-1990-AN ORAL HISTORY (1992) (presenting a
collection of personal accounts).
48. See generally supra note 46 and authorities cited therein on sexual minority issues
relating to family life.
49. See generally supra note 46 and authorities cited therein on family law and life.
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momentary, rather than comprehensive or conclusive, sense of
developments leading up to the present. And, as this depiction already
suggests, the first-stage history of sexual orientation law and activism
was accompanied by a scholarly or theoretical evolution that reflects
these doctrinal and political developments.
B. Postmodernism, Status/Conduct Issues, and Gender: A Theoretical
Sketch
The theoretical endeavors transpiring during the first stage have
tracked but not mirrored these doctrinal and political contestations. First-
stage theory, like first-stage doctrine and politics, has focused on three
broad areas of inquiry and exertion, encompassing broad slices of sexual
minority law and life. As with doctrine and politics, the anti-
discrimination tasks and goals of first-stage theory remain unfinished.
Perhaps the most prominent theoretical step of the first-stage years
has been about the de/construction of "sexual orientation" as a social
phenomenon or legal concept. This theorizing questioned the view of
sexual orientation as an essential or strictly biological trait, and advanced
the notion that "sexual orientation" is instead a social construction. This
step challenged the prevalence of modernism in contemporary under-
standings of "sexual orientation" and human identity.
This step thus joined the emergent field of sexual orientation
scholarship to the ongoing, transdisciplinary discourse over modernism
and postmodernism.5" This broader discourse sought to overturn the
modernist practice of viewing social and human phenomena in
unidimensional, categorical, ahistorical, and decontextualized terms.
Postmodernism charged that modernist scholarship overlooked context
and particularity, thereby "essentializing"5 its objects of analysis.
Advocates of postmodernism therefore sought to replace modernist
practices with new outlooks that recognized the constructedness of all
knowledge and discourse, and that thereby would produce analyses
50. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of
Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 43 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social
Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102
YALE L.J. 333 (1992) (book review); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994); Daniel
R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay
Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
51. See supra note 50 and authorities cited therein on essentialism and postmodernism in
gay and lesbian legal scholarship.
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qualified by factual, historical, cultural, and discursive contingencies or
particularities.
This dialogue over essentialism and constructionism became an early
locus of sexual orientation legal scholarship for two reasons. First, the
nascency of sexual orientation scholarship took place at the same time
that the established primacy of modernist essentialism in legal and other
theorizing was under challenge. Second, this controversy was/is directly
relevant to social and legal understandings of sexual orientation identity.52
This dialogue therefore not only helped shape first-stage theory, it also
helped to import postmodernism into legal culture and discourse.
The essentialism/constructionism debate also produced a subdialogue
about the distinction of "status" from "conduct" in legal doctrine and
theory. This subdialogue was prompted in part by judicial
pronouncements in status/conduct cases-cases like Padula and its
progeny that denied constitutional protection to sexual minority-identified
claimants on the grounds that their legal position pivoted on "behavior"
rather than identity.53 This judicial reaction, coupled with the larger
postmodern discourse, prompted several articles critiquing the
deployment of status/conduct notions to deflect or postpone the sexual
minority equality quest.54
Additionally, first-stage sexual orientation theorizing took up the
investigation of the relationship between sex, gender, and sexual
orientation. This investigation subjected to critical scrutiny the
intertwining of heterosexism and androsexism to produce male and
masculinist privilege, but this investigation also queried the association of
gender typicality with majority sexual orientation, or heterosexuality, and
the corresponding association of gender atypicality with minority sexual
orientations.55  This investigation thus brought to bear critical
52. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 111-16 (discussing the relevance of the
essentialism/constructionism discourse to sexual orientation and legal reform).
53. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Padua ruling).
54. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531 (1992); Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of
"Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 223 (1996).
55. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gay Men, and Feminist
Legal Theory, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994); Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas,
Queens and Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 33 (1995) [hereinafter Arriola, Faeries]; Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
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consideration of the intricate and myriad forms of interplay among these
constructs, and of the biases exercised through them, to reiterate sex,
gender, and sexual orientation in culturally and legally cognizable ways.
These three general areas of scholarly inquiry and theorizing
accompanied and approximated the doctrinal critiques and the litigation
efforts of the period between the first symposium and this one. These
three areas--the application of postmodern insights to sexual orientation
scholarship, the contestation over legal conceptions and deployments of
status and conduct, and the social and legal interplay of sex, gender, and
sexual orientation-thereby effectively outline a loose framework and the
general parameters of first-stage sexual orientation legal theory. Without
doubt, this framework has advanced the struggle against sexual
orientation discrimination, and it also has enriched contemporary critical
legal knowledge and scholarship. But this framework simultaneously
deferred areas of inquiry that are indispensable to a complete
Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians
and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1995); Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Heteropatriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender
and Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996); Valdes, Queers,
supra note 3; I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1158 (1991). This investigation is presaged in Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of
Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1979),
and, more recently, in Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 187. A related inquiry is the anti-miscegenation analogy, which compares sexual
orientation discrimination and racial discrimination by using sex and race. See Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); see also Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
For more recent discussions of analogies, see Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal
Discourse: Learning From the Civil Rights Movement in the Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil
Rights, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 679 (1996) (assessing the relevant similarities and differences
in the use of race and sexual orientation civil rights analogies to address the failings of each
movement); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies--Identity and "Passing": Race
and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 65 (1997) (analogizing race and sexual
orientation in the context of the military's anti-gay exclusion policy); Margaret M. Russell,
Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y
REP. 33 (1994) (comparing and contrasting sexual and racial minority civil rights quests to urge
careful and mutually beneficial coaitional projects); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283
(1994) (examining and questioning analogies and distinctions between sexual orientation and
other constructs, especially as used to promote anti-gay state referenda); see also Eaton, supra
note 12, at 59-68 (observing the dichotomizing and distorting effects of unidimensional
analogizing); Gilmore, infra note 97 (describing some reasons for African American skepticism
of such analogies); Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 583-84 (questioning the utility of
unidimensional analogies).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
QUEER MARGINS, QUEER ETHICS
understanding of "sexual orientation" discrimination and to a continuing
dismantlement of straight supremacy.
C. Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Subordination Agendas: Diversifying
Justice
The body of work created by sexual minority legal scholars since the
first symposium on sexual orientation and law in 1979 evinces a
consistent concern with combatting "sexual orientation" oppression. This
concern has manifested itself time and again through cases, projects, and
articles that address constitutional, statutory, and common law anti-
discrimination issues.56 These efforts display a collective first-stage
concern with heterosexist supremacy expressed and enacted in varied
social contexts through the force or complicity of law.
But the singular focus on "sexual orientation" excluded from first-
stage scholarship any consideration of possible complexities in the legal
or social oppression of sexual minorities. This exclusion effectively
"essentialized" sexual minority communities and issues through analyses
that apparently assumed and at least projected a monolithic "gay"
community.57 The essentializing first-stage failure to modify "sexual
orientation" analyses with intersecting factors like race or ethnicity
therefore left unexamined and unchallenged significant sources of
oppression that affect the social and legal position of non-white members
of sexual minority communities. The first-stage anti-discrimination
agenda, though broad and ambitious, was limited by its unmodified
approaches to "sexual orientation" issues.58
At the same time, nothing to date suggests that present-day Queer
activism and theorizing, or a prospective second-stage scholarship, is
inclined to abandon this broad anti-discrimination quest. In fact, the
56. See supra notes 20-55 and accompanying text (reviewing the first-stage record); see
also Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1508
(1989) (surveying the manifold social and legal settings of first-stage anti-discrimination
efforts); Jan K. Gray, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Recent Cases Affecting
the Rights of Gays, Lesbians and Bisexuals, 3 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 379 (1993) (providing a
similar survey).
57. See Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 585 ("Gay and lesbian legal theorists embrace
essentialism by excluding issues of race from analysis."). Similar observations have been
offered regarding feminist legal theory, both by lesbian and nonwhite feminist scholars. See,
e.g., infra note 90 and authorities cited therein on essentialism and feminist legal theory.
58. See generally Eaton, supra note 12, at 65-69 (discussing the limitations of unmodified
sexual orientation analyses).
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critical, iconoclastic, and progressive anti-subordination ideals associated
with Queer positionality would suggest the contrary.59 Thus, second-
stage theorizing constitutes an opportunity to carry forward the broad but
hitherto unmodified anti-discrimination commitments of the first stage as
part of an evolving anti-subordination agenda. This agenda, modified by
second-stage consideration of sexual orientation's racialized and
ethnicized dimensions-as well as other intersectional dimensions-would
represent a continuing yet evolving articulation of basic anti-
discrimination ideals and principles.' The transition from the first to the
second stage in sexual minority theorizing might-and should-be the
occasion for the transition from essentialized or unmodified anti-
discrimination critiques to nuanced and multidimensional anti-
subordination projects on behalf of diverse sexual minority interests.61
The move from an unmodified anti-discrimination agenda to an
expansive anti-subordination commitment thus signals second-stage
recognition and acceptance of sexual minority diversities. And because
postmodern anti-subordination analyses (unlike first-stage anti-
discrimination critiques) depend necessarily on the application of
concepts like multiplicity, intersectionality, and multidimensionality,'
this move also should commence a second-stage examination of those
diversities' doctrinal and political ramifications. In light of the record
established in outside jurisprudence during the past several years,63 this
59. Though not always realized in practice, Queer sensibilities embrace expansive,
resolute, and egalitarian anti-subordination stances. The Queer Nation chapter in New York
City announced: "Being queer... means everyday fighting oppression, homophobia, racism,
misogyny, the bigotry of religious hypocrites and our own self-hatred." ANONYMOUS QUEERS,
QUEERS READ THIS (1990), reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 45-47 (William
B. Rubenstein ed. 1993); see also supra note 6 on the term "Queer" and its signification.
60. See generally Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976) (elaborating a principle of anti-
discrimination as a constitutional value and norm).
61. Thus, a key difference between a first-stage "anti-discrimination" agenda and a
second-stage "anti-subordination" agenda is a broader commitment to resist all forms of
oppression, and to recognize the interlocking nature of social systems or legal structures that
construct and concentrate power and privilege along multiple axes at once. See generally supra
note 15 and authorities cited therein on multidimensionality or cosynthesis in legal analysis and
theory; see also infra note 84 and authorities cited therein on the cross-correlation of bigotries
rooted in race, sex, and sexuality.
62. For readings on these and similar concepts, see supra note 15 and sources cited
therein on these and similar concepts.
63. For a comparative critical account of outsider discourses on race, ethnicity, and
sexual orientation, see Francisco Valdes, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Comparative Anti-
Subordination Experience and Post-Subordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, in
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move is imperative because it is necessary to a second-stage confirmation
and advancement of the first-stage struggle against sexual minority
oppression.
Given the past and present record of dedication to anti-
discrimination ideals and goals, this Essay proceeds from the premise that
Queer or second-stage scholarship remains earnestly committed to the
continuing fight against sexual orientation oppression; though anti-
subordination principles entail much more than unmodified anti-
discrimination projects, both represent a quest for liberation from
oppressive hierarchies. Given the first-stage record and the professed
values of contemporary Queer sensibilities,' the discussion that follows
accepts and argues that a central purpose of second-stage scholarship
must be to promote anti-subordination principles and ideals in varied
"sexual orientation" contexts-contexts that vary because they reflect not
only the doctrinal but also the social diversities of sexual orientation
issues, identities, and interests. The immediate query, then, is how to
delineate and configure the parameters and projects of "sexual
orientation" law, theory, and politics to promote diversified anti-
subordination objectives.
D. Race and Ethnicity: A Pending Anti-Subordination Interrogation
As the foregoing account of the first-stage record suggests, sexual
orientation anti-discrimination legal discourse is quite accomplished, both
doctrinally and theoretically, though still quite young. But, as the
foregoing account also indicates, conspicuously missing from first-stage
accomplishments is a sustained, widescale effort to engage race and
ethnicity in the disempowerment or marginalization of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transsexual, or trans/bi-gendered persons both within and
beyond sexual minority communities.6 Though race and ethnicity
operate to oppress Queers of color both in law and society generally, as
well as within "our" communities specifically, the first stage of sexual
orientation scholarship has not yet attended to these aspects of "sexual
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HIsTORIEs, CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS (Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.
et al. eds., forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Valdes, Theorizing].
64. See supra notes 6 and 59 (describing professed Queer sensibilities).
65. The failure to engage race and ethnicity is made even more conspicuous when
contrasted to the relatively rich engagement of sex and gender during the same period. See,
e.g., supra note 55 and authorities cited therein on the interplay of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation.
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orientation" discrimination. This section of the Essay therefore turns to
that pending concern, urging an engagement of race and ethnicity at this
time for both substantive and strategic reasons.
It bears mention at the outset that the very project of a symposium
centered on sexual orientation and intersectionality speaks of the changes
that have transpired in law and throughout society since the 1979
symposium. The years since these two first-ever symposia have
witnessed the emergence of new subjectivities and identities that both
enrich and complexify "sexual orientation" discrimination in its many
social and legal forms. Among these are cross-communities of lesbians,
gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals, and trans/bi-gendered persons, all of
which are diverse in and across multiple dimensions-in and across class,
race, ethnicity, religion, location, dis/ability, and more.' This bundle of
overlapping identities and communities vividly portray, in concrete
cultural terms, why "sexual orientation" equality issues are normatively
and politically textured by race, ethnicity, and other diversities.
Thus, in the past several years, an internal racial critique of first-
stage scholarship has begun to emerge, pointing out the absence of race
or ethmicity in current analyses of sexual orientation subordination and
articulating some implications of this absence. 67 This critique complains
that, with few and limited exceptions, first-stage legal scholarship
focused on and presented an "essentialist" conception of "sexual
orientation" as if sexual minority communities were racially and/or
ethnically homogenous: 61 that is, first-stage analysis seems to presuppose
that all members of "the community" are "the same" racially or
ethnically.69  Moreover, and directly related to that appearance of
homogeneity, is the apparent first-stage sense that "sexual orientation"
66. This diversity is represented by the rich and growing literature authored by sexual
minorities of color in cultural and other studies. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 562-
63 & n.9 and authorities cited therein authored by lesbians and gays of color; see also Valdes,
Queers, supra note 3, at 358-60 (presenting similar writings and their relevance to Queer legal
theory).
67. See supra note 12 and authorities cited therein advancing this critique.
68. See Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 583-635 (presenting examples of essentializing
tendencies and their ramifications for sexual minority political discourse and legal theory).
69. This observation must be qualified with recognition of efforts to express inclusive or
broadened analyses, including, but not limited to, scholarship like RuTH COLKER, HYBRID:
BISExUALS, MULTIRACIAS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1996) and Kenneth
L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43
UCLA L. REV. 263 (1995); see also supra note 12 and authorities cited therein on sexual
orientation and various intersecting issues.
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constituted the only socially or legally contested aspect of sexual minority
lives and hopes.7' Thus, "sexual orientation" discrimination generally
was approached by both scholars and courts as a discrete category of
social and legal experience, an experience essentially unmodified by race
and ethnicity, or by racism and ethnocentrism.7 But, of course, we
know now-and could or should have known then-that such
essentializing unidimensionality is and was untenable. 72 The emergent
internal critique therefore is generally accurate on two counts: the actual
diversities of sexual minority communities as well as the overall absence
of those diversities, and of any critical analysis of their socio-legal
ramifications, in first-stage legal scholarship.
Undoubtedly, several developmental reasons can help to explain why
first-stage theorizing generally neglected the operation of race and
ethnicity, or white supremacy, both within sexual minority communities
and throughout law and society more generally. For instance, it is true
that the field is young; our scholarly exertions simply have not yet been
able to attend to all that they must. 3 In addition, first-stage efforts were
basically survivalist in nature. Following quickly on the heels of the
Stonewall Riots, first-stage legal scholarship proceeded from a position of
literal nonexistence to confront an establishment disinclined to treat
70. This view is perhaps most graphically represented by claims that same-sex marriage
rights or sexual orientation anti-discrimination legislation would effectively bring to an end the
need for any further anti-subordination efforts on behalf of sexual minorities. See Hutchinson,
supra note 12, at 585-602 (critiquing such claims).
71. See Eaton, supra note 12, at 52-66 (voicing a racial critique of the case law).
72. Numerous commentators over the years have pointed out the actual diversities in
sexual minority identities and interests, and have called for express recognition and
incorporation of those diversities in sexual minority discourses, politics, and organizations.
See, e.g., supra notes 12 and 69 and authorities cited therein on the actual diversity of sexual
minority communities and interests.
73. For instance, critical legal scholars writing from varied subject positions have
described or recounted the emergence of outsider genres in similar developmental terms. See
generally Cain, supra note 50, at 54-60 (urging deferral of race and ethnicity in lesbian legal
discourse because of discursive infancy); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xix-xxxii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (recounting the
chronological and conceptual development of critical race theory in relationship to civil rights
liberalism and critical legal studies); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) (describing the development of critical race theory
through its negotiation of the tensions between its modernist and postmodernist elements); MARI
J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER AND THE LAW
25-26 (1996) (providing a three-stage road map for developing a jurisprudence of color'
consisting of storytelling, doctrinal analysis, and theorizing). Compare Hutchinson, supra note
12, at 613-18 (taling exception to Professor Cain's use of a developmental rationale to defer
race and ethnicity in lesbian legal discourse).
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seriously any in/justice claims based on minority sexual orientations.7 4 In
those circumstances, perhaps a focus on "sexual orientation" unmodified
by race or ethnicity was valiant and progressive enough; embarking on a
long-term struggle to dislodge the supremacy of heterosexism may have
been enough to occupy the intellectual and political consciousness of first-
stage pioneers, thereby keeping issues of white supremacy in the
background during those early years. But the passage of time challenges
us to resist complacency, and time has passed.
Similarly, first-stage efforts also may reflect the influence of a
pragmatic "choose your battle" mentality-a perception, whether fully
conscious or not, that the sexual orientation anti-discrimination agenda
must be narrowly contoured due to strategic, if not substantive, reasons.
But this strategic mentality begs the fundamental question: the "sexual
orientation" agenda must include race, ethnicity, and other intersections
because these diversities are part of the sexual orientation communities
beset by social and legal injustice. A choice of "sexual orientation"
battles that depends on the sacrifice of some members of "our"
community based on race and ethnic affiliation is doomed to failure
because that choice depends on a false demographic picture, and also
because it forsakes powerful interconnective opportunities in intellectual
and political terms.
In addition, the postmodern insights of multiplicity and
intersectionality appeared relatively recently on the legal scholarly
scene-the late 1980s and early 1990s. 5 These tools or techniques of
mutidimensional analysis were thus perhaps tardy for timely or
meaningful incorporation into ongoing first-stage projects or agendas. In
some sense, first-stage sexual orientation legal scholarship simply
reflected the larger discursive status quo of its era. But then, like above,
the passage of time and the changes it produces requires us to keep up.
74. See generally Arriola, Faeries, supra note 55, at 49-76 (recounting the Stonewall
Riots, the years of extreme persecution leading up to them, and the leading role of drag queens
and people of color in them); MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) (presenting personal
accounts of the Riots and of the conditions then prevailing); DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS
(1971) (providing a history of the post-Stonewall gay liberation movement of the 1970s and the
obstacles it confronted).
75. Intersectionality and multiplicity were pioneered by Kimberld Crenshaw and Angela
Harris. See supra notes 2 and 15 and authorities cited therein on intersectionality and
multiplicity; see also infra notes 117-44 and accompanying text (further discussing these
concepts and their application in anti-discrimination law).
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These reasons no doubt help to explain the race/ethnicity contours of
first-stage efforts, but they do not account for all the probable causes of
those contours. Another reason, also developmental in nature, may help
to explain the racially and ethnically homogenized contours of first-stage
theorizing precisely by focusing on the role of racism and ethnocentrism
in constructing the first stage: the hegemony of white privilege in
American society and in its legal culture, including the legal academy,
may have helped to structure and direct first-stage investigations in ways
likely to marginalize nonwhite persons and interests.76 No doubt, in
some instances this marginalization may have occurred unconsciously,
reflecting the very problem of racism's penetration into social and
scholarly cultures.77
The real question, however, cannot be reduced to the causes or
motivation for first-stage deferrals; the real question is whether the
product-the potency of first-stage anti-discrimination analyses-would
have been greater if they had been sensitive to race, ethnicity, and other
intersecting constructs.7" In other words, the unmodified first-stage
concentration on sexual orientation may have been driven, at least in
part, by the impact of race and societal racism in the very formation,
composition, and consciousness of the first-stage ranks of sexual
orientation legal scholars, but the detriment ultimately redounds to the
value and quality of critical legal scholarship.
76. The sometimes subtle but always relentless power of white privilege has been
identified in various works. See, e.g., Peggy MacIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege:
A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in
POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman
eds., 1995) (describing specific but commonplace instances of white privilege that permeate
everyday life); Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See"- White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (discussing the impact of
white privilege, including the privilege of racial obliviousness, on the construction and
application of law). These and similar works have spawned a new field of critical legal studies.
See generally CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
77. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (articulating the concept
and consequences of unconscious racism).
78. See generally Clark Freshman, Were Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated
at Birth?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1568, 1594 (1995) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW (1995)) (arguing that the question is not whether Judge Richard A. Posner
intended his critique of Patricia Williams to be "racist," but whether the advancement of legal
scholarship would have been better served by a more sophisticated appreciation of Professor
Williams' own project).
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Of course, depending on perspective, each of these reasons may be
regarded as more or less "valid" or persuasive-that is, more or less
justificatory of the first-stage omissions regarding race, ethnicity and
white supremacy. And retrospective analyses also involve judgments
informed by subsequent events, which may in turn overlook or
misapprehend important features of the actual experience under
inspection. But the fundamentally developmental nature of all these first-
stage reasons suggest that they cannot explain-much less justify-a
continuing disengagement of race and ethnicity as we enter a second
stage of sexual orientation scholarship; the value of reasons tied to
questions of time and timing, or to levels of knowledge and
consciousness, dissipates with the passage of time, the accumulation of
knowledge, and the progression of consciousness. Thus, a continuing
second-stage disengagement increasingly becomes an act of choice, a
willful election to marginalize or ignore the possible, if not actual,
relevance of race, ethnicity and white supremacy in second-stage anti-
subordination sexual orientation analyses. And, as such, a present
decision to remain disengaged requires its own contemporary
justification.
But no valid justification exists. On the contrary, the persistence of
first-stage de facto essentialism into the second stage of sexual orientation
legal scholarship is likely to prove progressively problematic because it
effectively overlooks both the jurisprudential experiences of critical legal
studies79 and feminist legal theory8" as well as the substantive lessons
derived from those experiences. The histories of each experience
display, at the very least, an appearance of de facto essentialism that
occluded the myriad forms of bias that combine to oppress vulnerable
groups on the basis of race, class, gender, sexual orientation and other
constructs.81 Such oversights truncate critical analysis, thereby provoking
79. See infra note 92 (describing the rupture between minority and majority critical legal
scholars over the failure of critical legal studies to incorporate a diverse discourse about race
within its analysis of social injustice).
80. See infra note 90 (describing the critique of feminist legal theory's failure to account
for race and sexual orientation in its analysis of gender and gender subordination).
81. See Valdes, Latinalo, supra note 14, at 4-7 (briefly recounting this history in the
context of critical race theory's relationship to diverse Latina/o interests, and addressing the
implications of that history for the emergence of LatCrit theory as a distinct genre of critical
legal scholarship). For further readings on LatCrit theory, see Colloquium, Representing
Latina/o Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996);
Colloquium, International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 177 (1996-97); Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse
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internal critiques and objections of the sort now emerging within sexual
orientation legal discourse. Consequently, those jurisprudential
movements over time produced refined tools for sophisticated anti-
subordination analysis-tools that include multiplicity, intersectionality
and multidimensionality.' These-and others under development-are
tools available to second-stage scholarship, or Queer legal theory, to
avoid the costs and dangers of de facto essentialism and to capture the
substantive and political gains of broadened or multidimensional analyses.
Indeed, these analytical tools are useful and beneficial to Queer
theorizing precisely because they were forged from the circumstances
that face our second-stage scholarship: those tools are designed to avert
de facto or inadvertent essentialism in critical legal scholarship, thereby
strengthening the substantive insights of all critical anti-subordination
scholarship. Those jurisprudential experiences thus provide insightful
historical and substantive lessons for second-stage sexual orientation
scholarship.
Moreover, a persistent avoidance of race and ethnicity in second-
stage scholarship also would run contrary to the demonstrated and
demonstrable diversities of sexual minorities.83 Prevailing circumstances
regarding both the state of legal theory and demographic knowledge
counsel against the belief that a principled justification can be proffered
for the continuation of first-stage disengagement into a second stage of
development. Thus, the experience of critical legal studies and feminist
legal theory with anti-essentialism critiques, the substantive insights or
analytical tools derived from those experiences, and the knowledge that
sexual minorities in fact are demographically diverse, counsel for the
move from anti-discrimination to anti-subordination in the second stage
of sexual orientation legal scholarship. This view, as explained below, is
grounded in both substantive and strategic factors.
of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); Symposium, Latinas/os,
LatCrit Theory and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997); Symposium, Difference, Solidarity
and Law: Building Latinalo Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
82. See supra notes 2 and 15 (describing intersectionality, multiplicity, and
multidimensionality).
83. See supra note 12 and authorities cited therein expressing some such diversities.
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H. The Second Stage and Legal Theory: At the Intersection of
Color and Sexuality
Because the substantive and strategic considerations that counsel for
a genuine engagement of race and ethnicity commingle, the discussion
properly begins with the bottom line: a willful continuation of first-stage
deferrals on race and ethnicity is likely to truncate our conception and
understanding of "sexual orientation" identities, interests, and issues
among and across various and diverse sexual minority communities.
This truncation results from the fact that "different" expressions of
privilege and prejudice in fact tend to operate in interlocking or
correlated fashion: though white supremacy technically is not "the same"
as patriarchy, and neither of those structures is "the same" as
heterosexist hegemony, persons and forces affiliated with one will tend to
affiliate with the others.' These structures, on the whole, operate in
mutually-reinforcing ways. Their resistance, consequently, must be
similarly structured.
And even if social science and experience did not demonstrate the
interconnectedness of oppressions, the fact remains that each of these
structures-patriarchy, white supremacy and heterosexist hegemony-
affect the "community" of multiply diverse lesbians, gay men, and other
sexual minorities that sexual orientation legal scholarship seeks to shield
from discrimination.85  For these reasons, the benefits of anti-
discrimination analyses can accrue to the ostensible social constituency of
sexual orientation legal scholarship only if those analyses account for the
impact on "our" communities of all relevant forms of oppression. For
these reasons, a failure to move beyond first-stage gains and insights
increasingly will constrain the further development of sexual minority
legal discourse.
Substantively, this truncation therefore is likely to overlook
postmodern lessons and diverse particularities that will compromise the
analytical scope and depth of sexual orientation theorizing, thereby
84. See, e.g., Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination: Use of Acts of
Discrimination Against "Other" Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal
Employment Law, 43 STAN. L. REv. 241 (1990) (discussing the normative inter-relationship of
various strains of bias); Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 55-56 n.148 (describing studies that
correlate racist, sexist, and homophobic attitudes); id. at 89 n.247 (describing studies that
correlate sexist and homophobic socialization processes).
85. See supra note 12 and authorities cited therein reflecting sexual minority diversities
based on race, class, nationality, and ethnicity.
1320 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
QUEER MARGINS, QUEER ETHICS
weakening the ultimate reformatory potential of Queer legal theory.
Strategically, this truncation is likely to incite alienation among sexual
minorities of color from sexual orientation discourse and to invite
increasingly sharp internal critiques pointing out the substantive
deficiencies caused by disengagement. A refusal to venture affirmatively
into the intersection of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, in short, is
a self-defeating exercise for second-stage scholars.
A. Costs and Benefits of Dis/Engagement: A Substantive and Strategic
Analysis
As the emergent internal critique has begun to demonstrate, ignoring
race and ethnicity in sexual orientation law and scholarship effectively
codes "sexual orientation" as white and "race" or "ethnicity" as
heterosexual, a coding that is factually inaccurate.86 This coding in turn
erects an equally false dichotomy between "sexual orientation" and
"race" or "ethnicity" in social and legal conceptions or perceptions of the
persons and groups implicated by anti-subordination struggles linked to
this trio of constructs. This inaccuracy, necessarily imported into
scholarly (and doctrinal) analysis, cannot help but to distort anti-
discrimination theorizing (and adjudication).
This coding and its unidimensional dichotomizing additionally instill
among and beyond sexual minority communities and discourses a
simplistic and false notion that anti-subordination projects require sexual
minorities simply to "build bridges" or merely to "form coalitions" with
communities of color. 7  These effects-the unidimensional dichotomy
and simplistic notions of coalitional dynamics-are pernicious because
they erase the presence of persons of color within and throughout
multiply diverse sexual minority communities; Queers of color already
86. See Eaton, supra note 12, at 59-68 (critiquing such coding in judicial analysis of
sexual orientation equality claims and in legal discourse generally).
87. Coalitional sensibilities and projects, I have urged elsewhere, are important and
necessary. See Valdes, Sex and Race, supra note 15, at 65-70. While I adhere to that strong
inclination, the point here is that the related notion or image of "building bridges" suggests that
sexual minorities are "here" and people of color are "there"-a simplistic, false and
unproductive image because sexual minority people of color are both "here" and "there"
already. For more on coalitions, see Sharon Parker, Understanding Coalition, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1193 (1991) (providing a pragmatic outlook on the difficulties and benefits of coalitional
work); Haunani-Kay Trask, Coalition-Building Between Natives and Non-Natives, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1197 (1991) (discussing anti-subordination coalitional politics in Hawai'i).
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help to constitute "our" communities. 8  Thus, ignoring the presence and
relevance of race and ethnicity within sexual orientation communities
degrades the existence and importance of color to sexual minority lives
and to sexual minority experiences with discrimination.89 This practice
over time fosters cynicism and destabilizes opportunities for synergistic
anti-subordination critiques because the erasure of human existence or
experience in any setting is antithetical to normative and intellectual
justice expectations.' By overlooking the demonstrated and demonstrable
facts or ramifications of sexual minority diversities, 9 second-stage
theorizing helps to sow the seeds of internal critique and, perhaps,
ultimately, alienation, division, or separation.'
Incrementally but steadily, second-stage theorizing that acquiesces to
the first-stage essentialism of sexual orientation scholarship consequently
compromises the creation of a strong and diverse sexual minority
community of scholars; rather than contribute to a positive cultivation of
intra-group solidarity in the struggle against sexual orientation
subordination in its many forms and settings, a continuing disengagement
of race and ethnicity is likely over time to fracture Queer legal theory
along color lines. Internal fragmentation along diversity fault lines
cannot help but hobble second-stage capacities to mobilize collective
exercises of political will and intellectual insight toward sexual minority
self-empowerment.
88. See generally supra note 12 and authorities cited therein voicing a "Queer of color"
perspective.
89. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 567-635 (outlining such oversights, both in
"real life" and in legal or political discourses).
90. This point is at the core of the anti-essentialist critiques leveled in recent years at
feminist legal theory both by scholars writing from an explicitly lesbian subject position, who
complained of sexual orientation erasure, as well as by scholars writing from a women-of-color
perspective, who complained of racial erasure. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist
Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-1990) (writing
from a lesbian perspective); Harris, supra note 15 (writing from a black woman's position).
91. See supra note 12 and authorities cited therein on sexual minorities of color.
92. The danger of critique turning into division or separation is the lesson to be drawn
from the experience of critical legal studies with race or, more specifically, with its failure to
engage race. That failure triggered an explosive confrontation at a key conference, eventually
yielding the body of scholarship now known as critical race theory. See CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, supra note 73, at xxii-xxvii (describing that confrontation and its role in the formation
of critical race theory as a genre and community separate from, though sometimes in sympathy
with, critical legal studies); see also, Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism: Minority Critique
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (1987) (describing
the conference in more detail). This rupture produced Symposium, Minority Critiques of the
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 297 (1987).
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Moreover, the practice of erasure inevitably inflicts discursive
violence on lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans/bi-gendered persons of
color, thereby effectively replicating the dynamics of hierarchy and
invisibility that "we" complain about regarding heterosexist privilege and
supremacy.93 This practice therefore undercuts more than the political
project of community formation and intra-group solidarity as a tool
toward self and collective empowerment; this practice inflicts within
"our" communities the same wrongs about which we complain more
generally. This practice, in other words, undercuts the intellectual
integrity and moral force of sexual orientation justice claims that at the
very least acquiesce to, thereby perpetuating, similar patterns of social or
legal injustice. 94
Neglecting the interplay of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation,
and the interlocking dynamic of white and heterosexist privilege,
similarly fosters tensions between second-stage scholarship and the
antiracist imperatives of the ongoing anti-subordination struggle being
mounted by scholars and communities of color-a struggle that directly
affects Queers of colors, as well as nonQueer peoples of color. These
intra- and inter-group tensions are counterproductive because they impede
coalitional collaboration both within and beyond sexual orientation
contexts in ways that perpetuate both white and heterosexist hegemony.95
This practice, in short, is politically self-defeating and intellectually
problematic in many ways and forms.
Significantly, the perils of this practice are not merely abstract. The
material effects of first-stage erasure or marginality already may have
helped to define the anti-discrimination sexual orientation agenda in
actual or concrete ways because, over time, ignoring or erasing race and
ethnicity skews not only political priorities and legal analyses but also the
deployment of sexual minority material resources. Not surprisingly, this
93. From inception, a key complaint of sexual minority critiques has been the social and
psychological violence of the Closet and its imposition both of invisibility and of oppression.
See, e.g., Valdes,, supra note 21, at 223-28 (discussing the prominence of in/visibility issues
and strategies in sexual minority anti-discrimination theory and politics).
94. Of course, this sort of passive complicity can be exacerbated by affirmative calls to
reject outright the struggle against racism and white supremacy (or sexism and patriarchy) as
relevant to "gay" anti-discrimination projects. See, e.g., RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A
STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY AND LAW 328 (1988) (asserting that struggles against racism (and
sexism) are not "gays' fights").
95. See, e.g., Valdes, Sex and Race, supra note 15, at 34-50 (describing and discussing
similarly problematic tensions along sex and race lines within sexual minority settings).
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concern over skew and consequence surfaces as part of the internal racial
critique of sexual orientation legal scholarship and political advocacy.'
If the goals or contents of sexual minority anti-discrimination
campaigns effectively reflect primarily the interests of racially or
ethnically privileged segments within diverse sexual minority
communities, current or recent anti-discrimination campaigns may not
serve the long-term anti-subordination interests of diverse sexual minority
communities in equitable ways. Because they not only ignore but may
help to preserve existing racialized power relations both within and
beyond sexual minority communities, such campaigns may feed the
suspicion of exploitation, and the consequential alienation, that already
festers among some lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals, and the
trans/bi-gendered of color due to first-stage neglect. 7  If so, the
racialized priorities reflected and projected via these campaigns may tend
to hasten a hardening reluctance among sexual minorities of color to join
sexual orientation liberation projects during a second stage of activism
and scholarship.
In sum, a failure to begin accounting for race and ethnicity in
second-stage projects and scholarship can exact both substantive and
strategic costs. Such a failure may interfere with substantive analyses of
sexual orientation inequality because it serves to limit "our" collective
ability to detect, unpack, expose, and critique complex sources and
intersectional patterns of sexual minority subordination. Such a failure
may impede anti-subordination politics both within and beyond sexual
minority communities because it serves to create tensions with ongoing
antiracist struggles against white supremacy. But even more so, a
continued disengagement of race and ethnicity disregards the opportunity
occasioned by second-stage discourse to announce and nourish an ethic of
mutual care, respect, and support that resolutely rejects and repudiates
white supremacy as integral to the fight against straight supremacy; an
96. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 585-602, 619-30 (discussing the racialized
implications or ramifications of recent prominent controversies or initiatives, including same-
sex marriage and military exclusion).
97. See, e.g., Angela Gilmore, They're Just Funny That Way: Lesbians, Gay Men and
African-American Communities as Viewed Through the Privacy Prism, 38 How. L.J. 231
(1994) (discussing some hostilities, and the reasons for them, that exist between those who
identify both with lesbian and gay communities and with African American communities); see
generally supra note 12 and authorities cited therein expressing the disenchantment of lesbians
and gays of color with "mainstream" gay and lesbian priorities or politics.
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ethic that ultimately is necessary to the dignity, harmony, and equality
that all humans deserve regardless of color or sexuality.
On the other hand, a collective and proactive engagement of race
and ethnicity in second-stage scholarship will more than avert these
substantive and strategic costs; the pending engagement affirmatively will
accrue both substantive and strategic benefits in the cause of sexual
minority empowerment and liberation, and these likely gains provide the
more compelling reasons for engagement. Engagement will deepen and
broaden the discourse and knowledge of second-stage theorizing,
enhancing the incisiveness of Queer legal theory and promoting a positive
standard of community-building and group empowerment through legal
scholarship. These gains can only translate into a sharper and stronger
sexual minority anti-subordination movement.
Perhaps most importantly, this engagement can be employed as an
opportunity for Queer legal theory to elaborate and demonstrate an ethic
of mutual care and recognition for the general betterment of
contemporary political discourse and critical legal scholarship. In short,
collectively and mutually embracing the engagement of race and ethnicity
at the threshold of a second stage in the development of sexual orientation
legal theory amounts to doing the right thing. In light of known
demographics and discourses, it would be ethically Queer indeed to
decline or circumvent this pending engagement; but mutual and collective
engagement would put the critical and egalitarian ethos of Queer values
and ideals to practice.98
B. Mutual Moves: From De Facto Essentialism, Toward an Ethic of
Caring Recognition
Because all humans deserve dignity and equality, and because sexual
minority legal scholars consistently profess adherence to that basic
ideal,' it is incumbent upon second-stage scholars collectively to create a
discursive environment and community where dignity and equality
98. See supra notes 6 and 59 (discussing "Queer" sensibilities and ideals).
99. A fundamental element of sexual orientation anti-discrimination scholarship is a broad
assertion of human entitlement to dignity and equality. See generally supra notes 20-49 and
accompanying text (discussing the centrality of "equality" to sexual minority justice claims).
This point is expressed, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, in the practice of
analogizing sexual orientation discrimination to race or other forms of discrimination. See
generally Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 624-31 (noting expressions of, and objections to, this
practice); see also supra note 55 and authorities cited therein in analogies.
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flourish. To do so, we must craft and practice an ethic of mutual and
caring recognition. Though not susceptible to fixed or technical
detailing, the basic purpose of such an ethic-to promote anti-
subordination scholarship reflective of and responsive to sexual minority
diversities-would mandate a collective and sustained engagement of
race, ethnicity and sexual orientation. This ethic envisions the same level
of attention to intra- and inter- group claims, positions or issues that
recently have drawn the increased attention of outsider scholars in race
and ethnicity legal discourses."° This engagement, however, must be
approached from all quarters with a clear and accepted anticipation of
vigorous exchange and disagreement tempered always by the commitment
to remain mutually engaged.
To inaugurate a second stage of sexual orientation legal scholarship
with an ethic of mutual and caring recognition, sexual minority legal
theorists of all stripes must commit to exertions hitherto lacking. Both
white and nonwhite legal scholars who write from a lesbian, gay,
bisexual or trans/bi-gendered subject position must listen to and learn
from each others' insights and perspectives; a mutual commitment to the
advancement of anti-subordination knowledge and discourse on behalf of
a diverse constituency provides good reason for mutual attention. We
must, therefore, accept personal responsibility for the further
development of sexual orientation scholarship in a manner called for by
the histories of social and jurisprudential experience; we must make
foundational of second-stage theorizing an express acknowledgment of,
and continuing respect for, both the actual diversities of sexual minorities
as well as postmodernism's lessons about the analytical and discursive
significance of historicity, particularity, and construction.1 0
Furthermore, an affirmative cultivation of such an ethic is at a
premium at this time precisely because the existing record on race,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation is wanting."° Thus, white or otherwise
privileged sexual minority scholars must unambiguously resist the
tendency, or temptation, to essentialize second-stage analyses,
recognizing that sexual orientation essentialism reaps or exploits the
benefits to them of society's racial stratification. Queer legal theorists
100. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and
Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA AsIAN-PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995); see also HARLON L. DALTON,
RACIAL HEALING (1995).
101. See supra notes 50-64 (on diversity and postmodernism in relationship to sexual
minorities and legal scholarship).
102. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing first-stage essentialism).
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should signal their grasp of preceding anti-essentialist critiques by
refusing, even tacitly, to accept within our work the racist structures of
subordination that privilege whiteness both within and beyond sexual
minority communities and the legal academy. 1 3 Second-stage scholars
must reject positions or analyses that project privilege or a sense of de
facto essentialism."°
In this vein, sexual minority theorists likewise ought to exercise care
in recognizing, denoting, and factoring the racial(ized) subject position
from which we conceive and articulate our analyses. A scholar's failure
of racial and ethnic self-awareness effectively indulges the danger that the
resultant analysis will miss the race/ethnic issues that interlace and
permeate sexual minority communities and issues. This failure of
conscious subjectivity in turn is likely to project dominant norms (like
whiteness) as an implicit or intrinsic feature of sexual orientation law,
politics, and theory. In doing so, this cramped approach is likely to miss
the racialized and ethnicized dimensions of social and legal issues folded
into sexual orientation lives and concerns.
Concomitantly, nonwhite sexual minority scholars should, at least
for the time being, recall the developmental reasons that at least partially
may underlie the belatedness of the still-pending engagement of race and
ethnicity within sexual orientation legal scholarship. 5 Though separatist
inclinations based on past experience may prove sound, and though past
disappointment may cause some scholars, whether white or of color, to
be skeptical of the present prospects for collective mutuality,16 the
potential benefits of a mutual and collective engagement in the context of
second-stage scholarship are significant enough to warrant some
allowance and encouragement of an opportunity for a timely
demonstration of the present capacity to progress. And because the
developmental nature of first-stage circumstances causes the reasons for
103. Technically no outright calls for essentialism have yet issued from within the sexual
minority legal scholarship, but they have surfaced in other sexual minority discourses that
impact on legal discourse. See, e.g., supra note 94 (pointing to Richard Mohr's assertion that
racist and sexist struggles are not "gays' fights").
104. See Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 600-18 (taking exception to essentializing arguments
posited by sexual minority legal scholars in various contexts, including the same-sex marriage
debate, and questioning the liberational potential for diverse sexual minorities of de facto
essentialism in sexual minority politics and theorizing).
105. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text (outlining some developmental reasons
that may help to explain the first-stage deferral of race and ethnicity).
106. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 634 n.311 (expressing skepticism about
collaborative or coalitional efforts due to past experience).
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deferral to lose their explanatory value over time, only time-and what
second-stage scholars jointly do with it-will tell whether an honest,
sustained, and mutual ethical commitment to care and recognition exists.
Ideally, the immediate future will witness articles, conferences, and
projects that affirmatively manifest an inclusive though critical
recognition of sexual orientation's racial and ethnic dimensions. 7
Ideally, the immediate future also will produce lively exchanges,
including intellectual disagreement, between diverse sexual minority
scholars over the social and legal interplay of race, ethnicity and sexual
orientation in the cross-construction of white and straight supremacy.
Ideally, this mutuality and collectivity of engagement will foster a strong
discursive community and forestall or negate calls to distance, separation,
alienation, or faction within the still-growing ranks of second-stage sexual
minority legal scholars.
Of course, no one can judge for all the period of time that should be
allowed to pass before further conclusions are drawn. I decline to
speculate here because no benefit inheres in such speculation. More
useful is to emphasize now that, with the passage of time, all concerned
scholars will have the opportunity, and a better-developed record of
experience, to determine how the future of Queer legal theory and related
anti-subordination politics ought to be shaped in light of a prospective
second-stage non/engagement of race and ethnicity.
Clearly, no single scheme or suggestion should be mistaken for a
panacea. And like any scheme, the ethics and values urged here can be
convoluted or abused, especially by sophisticated rhetoricians. But to
honor this ethic in the breach would ensure a devolution of second-stage
legal discourse to the detriment of all sexual minorities, both
substantively and strategically.' Thus, it behooves all second-stage
legal scholars not only to cultivate an ethic of mutual care and recognition
directly through our projects and activities, but also to urge that our
colleagues in sexual minority scholarship do likewise. A genuine and
good faith commitment to the second-stage engagement of race and
ethnicity must be our aim and standard, and we should do no less.
107. See, e.g., Symposium, Entering "New" Intersections: Race, Ethnicity and Sexual
Orientation in Law and Legal Theory, 2 NAT. J. SEX. ORIENT. L. (forthcoming 1998)
<http://www.sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw>.
108. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (summarizing the substantive and
strategic reasons for the race/ethnicity engagement).
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C. Queering Second-Stage Sexual Minority Scholarship: Ways and Means
To maximize the law's responsiveness to the diverse sexual minority
communities that second-stage scholars seek to benefit, each Queer legal
theorist must exercise direct responsibility for bridging the gaps of the
first stage; each of us, in our work as teachers, scholars and activists,
must practice what the lessons of the recent past make plain. This
process might appropriately be described as the Queering of sexual
orientation legal scholarship because Queer values, sensibilities, and
imperatives are relentlessly egalitarian, and suspicious of all
essentializing categorization." °  And so I proffer here four specific
suggestions as to how second-stage scholarship might take and exercise
this sort of responsibility-the responsibility to carry sexual orientation
legal scholarship beyond the gains and limits of the first stage-in an
ongoing way that reflects Queer positionality through constructive and
empowering ways and means.
The first suggestion is to adopt, in a conscious and consistent way,
the jurisprudential method that Professor Mari Matsuda has called "ask
the other question":110 regardless of the subject position taken in any
project, we must learn to step back from that position and query
ourselves how the analysis might be broadened or deepened if the topic
or issue were to be approached from another subject position. Professor
Matsuda explains her use of this method: "When I see something that
looks racist, I ask, 'Where is the patriarchy in this?' When I see
something that looks sexist, I ask, 'Where is the heterosexism in this?'
When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, 'Where are the class
interests in this?'" Through this method, Professor Matsuda explains,
she and other anti-subordination legal scholars work "to understand the
interconnection of all forms of subordination.""' And though the critical
insights derived from "asking the other questions" may not shift the main
focus of the project at hand, their incorporation into the analysis can only
enrich and expand the reach of second-stage work.
A related suggestion similarly involves raising and addressing
another set of questions left unasked by first-stage scholarship. These
"other questions" include: What are the intersectional effects of a given
109. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 346-75 (describing one vision of Queer legal
theory).
110. See Mar J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1991).
111. Id.
August 1997]
analysis, strategy or initiative... will the impact of our work be racially
or ethnically disparate . . . will our work tend to replicate and reinforce
the extant marginalization of lesbians and gays of color within "our"
communities, organizations, or projects? Asking, and responding to, this
intersectional self-questioning--and specifically focusing on the
(disparate) effects that we create through our work-can help sexual
minority scholars to become more self-aware and self-critical of our
direct implication in the construction or maintenance of "sexual
orientation" as a de/racialized or de/ethnicized socio-legal phenomenon;
these questions can nudge second-stage scholars toward the exercise of
greater responsibility in the development of a scholarly culture that resists
complicity in a false race/ethnicity homogenization of "sexual
orientation" interests and agendas.
The third suggestion is, simply, to do the homework-the hard work
of reaching beyond the intellectual territories that we already occupy.
Ultimately, second-stage sexual minority scholars can only benefit from
becoming acquainted with the richness (and limitations) of outsider
jurisprudence, and with the increasing literature in cultural studies
devoted to the interconnection of race, ethnicity, sexuality and other
systems of power and domination."' Given today's status quo, a cross-
jurisprudential and cross-disciplinary approach to our research is not only
substantively enriching but analytically indispensable.
Finally, and more generally, the fourth suggestion is to encourage
and support colleagues, students, institutions, and organizations to engage
proactively in multidimensional or intersectional projects that can help
foster a discourse that is self-consciously endeavoring to carry out these
intensified interrogations. We must personally encourage and continually
support with our direct involvement or supervision students who express
interest in intersectional projects or papers; we must persistently nudge
the deans, faculties, or law reviews at our institutions to sponsor
symposia on subjects such as this one; we must systematically inquire of
our friends and colleagues at seminars, conferences, and presentations
how race or ethnicity might affect their developing analyses of
heterosexism; we must vocally push the professional or community
organizations that purport to serve sexual minority interests (and that seek
to claim our loyalty and support) to account for race and ethnicity in all
of their activities. That is, second-stage scholars must individually and
112. For representative sources, see Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 562-63 n.9.
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collectively endeavor to create an environment and a culture in which all
of us are conscious of whether or not we seriously and earnestly are
engaging in this sort of work.
These four steps may be modest in isolation, but they can become
powerful in accumulation. If second-stage scholars begin to take these
steps in earnest, we will strengthen ourselves as scholars, and our
movement as a community. If we do not, then we foreclose the
substantive or analytical benefits of prior experience and insight offered
by recent jurisprudential experiences, histories, and discourses.
Additionally, we may doom second-stage scholarship to replay the
limitations recorded by the similar experiences of critical legal studies,
feminist legal theory and, to some extent, critical race theory."' Our
good fortune is that we can learn from those histories without necessarily
repeating them; our good fortune depends on our doing so.
D. Qualifying Engagement: A Note on Limits and Progress
This call for a sustained and caring collective engagement of race
and ethnicity in the second stage of sexual orientation scholarship must be
tempered by a recognition of the limits involved in that task. Most
notably, this call does not require that every text or project follow a
standardized script, nor does it imply an obligation to center racial or
ethnic dimensions of sexual orientation discrimination in every analysis of
heterosexism. This call also cannot and does not contemplate an absolute
equation of race or racism with sexual orientation or heterosexism, nor
does this call insist that every analysis of heterosexism allocate "equal
time" to its interaction with racism or ethnocentrism. Finally, neither
this call nor the emerging internal critique seek to impose on any single
project the obligation of exposing definitively or conclusively the linkage
of white supremacy to heterosexist supremacy in law and society. 14
Instead, this call-and the emerging internal critique-strive for
progressively more self-critical considerations and articulations of anti-
heterosexist assumptions, premises, claims, or analyses that in fact
113. See generally Valdes, Latinalo, supra note 14, at 3-7 (discussing these experiences);
see also Valdes, Theorizing, supra note 63 (comparing QueerCrit, RaceCrit, and LatCrit
discourses).
114. In fact, these caveats express limitations similar to those acknowledged by scholars
raising the racial critique of first-stage scholarship. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 12, at
565 n.14 (acknowledging the limitations of the racial critique, and expressing the aspiration that
it "will serve as a starting point for a more intense examination of the various complexities"
that cause the subordination of diverse sexual minority communities); see also Harris, supra
note 8 (expressing similar sentiments).
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implicate racism or ethnocentrism in the operation of sexual orientation
discrimination. This call is for the termination of unmodified, monolithic
or essentializing projections of sexual orientation identities, interests, and
issues that necessarily obscure or erase social diversities and their legal
dimensions. In short, this call is for expressly denoting the reach and
constituencies of second-stage scholarship with ever-more thought and
texture than accompanied first-stage scholarship. Over time, this call and
the emergent internal critique aspire to a mutual engagement of complex
issues that is more likely to produce within the body of second-stage
works a sensibility that more accurately reflects, and responds to, the
lived experience and anti-subordination needs of the diverse populations
affected by "sexual orientation" discrimination.
E. Sexual Orientation and Critical Race Theory: A Call to Reciprocity
It also bears emphasis that the omission of race and ethnicity in the
first stage of sexual orientation scholarship is mirrored by the omission of
sexual orientation in the first decade of critical race theory; as a whole,
the body of work known today as critical race theory reflects an almost
complete lack of concern for the oppression of people of color with
minority sexual orientations. 15 This omission is problematic for similar
reasons: it erases the actual sexual orientation diversities of communities
of color; it obscures the mutually-reinforcing operation of racism,
ethnocentrism, and heterosexism in law and society; it disregards the
subordination of racial and ethnic minorities on sexual orientation
grounds; it truncates the scope and depth of critiques of white supremacy;
it factionalizes rather than coalesces progressive intra-group relations;
and it acquiesces to the perpetuation of homophobic inhumanity in the
name of antiracist liberation. 6 This omission therefore should be
addressed and rectified for the same substantive and strategic reasons
urged above for the second stage of sexual orientation scholarship.
Yesterday's omissions, regretfully mutual, now should be replaced with a
mutual entry into the intersection of race, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation. This brief notation thus constitutes, and issues, a call for
reciprocity.
115. See generally Valdes, Latinalo, supra note 14, at 6 (addressing why critical race
theory sometimes still wonders "what sexual orientation has to do with race").
116. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (discussing these points regarding the
omission of race and ethnicity from sexual orientation legal discourse).
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I. The Second Stage and Legal Doctrine: Sexual Orientation
and Intersectionalities
To close this Essay, this final part addresses why second-stage
scholarship and theorizing must recognize that the engagement of race
and ethnicity urged above is not a call merely to practice
"intersectionality" as we know it in sexual minority equality claims or
analyses. Though intersectional social analysis can help to uncover and
unpack the intertwining of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation in the
United States, its legal or doctrinal utility is limited. The cure for first-
stage inattention to racial and ethnic aspects of sexual orientation
discrimination is not, and cannot be, a mere extension of existing
intersectional practices to the interplay of white supremacy and
heterosexist supremacy in legal analysis because the current configuration
of existing anti-discrimination doctrine under federal law makes such an
extension unworkable.
A. Race and Gender: A Triumph of Intersectionality
The analytical tools known as multiplicity and intersectionality were
pioneered by critical race feminists to bring into sharp relief, and to
spotlight, the particularized interplay of white racism and androsexism." 7
This interplay targeted women of color for discrimination in ways that
did not apply either to men of color or to white women because this
particularized form of discrimination combined both race and gender.
Therefore, single-axis frames of analysis would tend to overlook this
form of intersectional bias, even though it literally and operationally was
based on two features of identity formally protected by current anti-
discrimination statutes: race and gender. Single-axis analyses and their
likely oversights would license hybrid forms of discrimination that
otherwise would be deemed outlawed, and simply because these hybrids
were "based" on more than one protected construct or category.
Intersectionality and multiplicity were developed to halt that perversion of
result.
This scenario is aptly illustrated by Lam v. University of Hawai'i,
where the Ninth Circuit adopted intersectionality as applied to race and
gender discrimination claims. Lam, a Vietnamese American woman,
117. See supra notes 2 and 15 and authorities cited therein noting the development of
intersectionality and multiplicity as tools of legal and social analysis.
118. 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
August 19971
claimed that the University of Hawai'i's law school denied her a position
in the Pacific Asian Legal Studies program (PALS) due to a combination
of race and gender biases. The district court entered summary judgment
for the defendant because of the law school's "favorable consideration of
two other candidates for the PALS position: one an Asian man and the
other a white woman."119 On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, citing
the work of critical race feminism on intersectionality.
The Ninth Circuit's intersectionality discussion began with the
observation that, "In assessing the [evidentiary or analytical] significance
of these candidates [to Lam's claim], the [district] court seemed to view
racism and sexism as separate and distinct elements amenable to almost
mathematical treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an Asian
woman became a simple matter of evaluating two separate tasks: looking
for racism "alone" and looking for sexism "alone," with Asian men and
white women as the corresponding model victims."" But, "[r]ather than
aiding the decisional process, the attempt to bisect a person's identity at
the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the particular
nature of their experience" with hybrid forms of discrimination, the court
continued.2 Thus, "when a plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is
necessary to determine whether the [defendant] discriminates on the basis
of that combination of factors, not just whether it discriminates against
people of the same race or of the same sex," the court concluded. 2
The Lam court's articulation and application of intersectionality as a
matter of anti-discrimination doctrine was cogent and coherent because it
captured the social dynamics of hybrid strains of prejudice. The Lam
analysis permitted the tribunal to comprehend and reach the social
operation of discrimination that combines the exercise of white and male
privilege to unfairly disadvantage specifically women of color. But the
Lam analysis hinged on the formal illegality of both race and gender
discrimination; had either race or gender been excluded from the text of
applicable anti-discrimination statutes, Lam's claim would have been
placed in an entirely different analytical position. And because the
practice of sexual orientation bias is perfectly legal under federal anti-
discrimination statutes, this is the position in which sexual minorities of
color find ourselves.
119. Id. at 1561.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1562.
122. Id. (emphasis in original).
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In Lam, this difference in legal position would have required the
plaintiff to shoulder the burden of proving that the bias against her was
concentrated in, or targeted at, the protected rather than the unprotected
feature of her identity. The defendant, on the other hand, simply would
need to profess that its bias was motivated by the unprotected, rather than
the protected, identity category. In other words, if either race or gender
were unprotected, the law effectively would have constructed a cover, or
loophole, for the practice of discrimination against the formally protected
category. Thus, intersectionality's effectiveness depends on the formal
protection of all relevant identity categories.
B. Sexual Orientation and Gender: A Failure of Intersectionality
The doctrinal experience with race and gender suggests that
intersectionality is not well suited to sexual orientation equality claims
because "sexual orientation discrimination" is not formally prohibited by
federal anti-discrimination statutes." And though the case law does not
provide ready examples of intersectional analyses in sexual orientation
cases, 4 it does provide a line of examples that involve combinations of
discrimination based on sex or gender and on sexual orientation. These
cases suggest that similar cases involving combinations of discrimination
based on race or ethnicity and on sexual orientation likely would fail.
Title VII case law includes a number of cases involving socially
gender-atypical men; that is, men that social gender norms would classify
123. See generally Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 136-75 (noting the legality of sexual
orientation discrimination under federal civil rights statutes). Conversely, this observation
suggests that intersectional claims or analyses may succeed under local or state laws that
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, an observation that underscores the importance of
regionalized anti-subordination efforts especially during times of federal indifference or
antipathy. See generally supra notes 40 and 45 and authorities cited therein on state or local
issues.
124. Only one intersectional federal anti-discrimination case involving race and sexual
orientation, Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (1989), is recorded. See
Eaton, supra note 12, at 54-56 (discussing the facts and results of the case). In Williamson, an
African American gay man claimed that his termination due to "unruly behavior" that involved
his workplace manifestation of gay identity constituted race discrimination because white gay
men who similarly manifested their sexual orientation in the workplace were not dismissed. See
Williamson, 876 F.2d at 70. The court rejected the claim, holding that Title VII does not
"prohibit discrimination against homosexuals." Id. Though Williamson provides only a single
example, the viability and consequences of the loophole for the practice of otherwise unlawful
prejudice that is created by sexual orientation's vulnerability is confirmed by the series of cases
that involve sex, gender, and sexual orientation in similar doctrinal contexts. See infra notes
125-40 and accompanying text (discussing this additional doctrinal record).
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as "sissies" and, by association, also "queer."'" Ironically, more often
than not these cases apparently involved men who, though deemed
socially effeminate, were also heterosexually self-identified; in other
words, the cases involved both gay and straight men who apparently were
socially gender-atypical. 126  These cases therefore implicated
discrimination based on sex and gender as well as discrimination based
on sexual orientation, whether perceived or actual. No doubt existed that
each case presented actual instances of sex and gender discrimination; but
each case also included some form of sexual orientation discrimination. 27
Importantly, in each case one of the relevant identity categories-sexual
orientation-did not enjoy formal legal protection.
As the intersectional cases on sex, gender, and sexual orientation
illustrate, the omission of the latter category from anti-discrimination
statutes or doctrines can facilitate discrimination based on the protected
categories of sex and gender. Thus, whereas intersectional legal analyses
can capture discrimination and combat its operation in race and gender
cases, when the intersecting categories are equally protected, the
sex/gender and sexual orientation cases indicate that a similar analysis is
likely to falter when the intersecting categories are not equally protected;
in these cases, the focus of analysis and decision is shifted by defendants
and courts from the protected to the unprotected category. The probable
result of this shift is predictable: exoneration through obfuscation.
In each such case, therefore, the defendants claimed that their
discriminatory acts were motivated by heterosexist, rather than
androsexist, bias.'8 Relieved of any need to deny their practice of
discrimination altogether, the legality of sexual orientation discrimination
in fact permitted the defendants to deploy their practice of a formally
lawful bigotry as their defense against allegations of a formally prohibited
bias. In effect, the defense in each of these cases was the interposition of
"sexual orientation" discrimination to deflect attention away from, and to
exonerate, "sex" and "gender" discrimination; in each case the defense
effectively amounted to a confessed exercise of prejudice against the
plaintiff's "queerness" to facilitate denial of prejudice against the
plaintiffs "sissiness." In each case the courts accepted that defense,
125. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 136-68 (reviewing the case law).
126. See id.
127. See id. (analyzing the interplay of sex/gender and sexual orientation biases in these
cases).
128. See id. (describing defendants' strategies and pleadings).
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thereby licensing the practice of both sex/gender and sexual orientation
discrimination.129
This line of cases is exemplified by the first of the series, Smith v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company."30 In Smith, a heterosexual man
claimed that he was denied employment on both sex/gender and
perceived sexual orientation grounds. In response to Smith's
interrogatories during discovery, the defendant candidly admitted that it
refused him employment because its interviewer had regarded Smith as
"effeminate" and "thus suspected Smith of homosexuality."' During
both the trial and appellate processes, Smith framed his claims by
emphasizing the sex/gender discrimination entailed by the defendant's
effeminacy bias; the employer, however, framed its defense by
consistently emphasizing its suspicion of same-sex orientation.' 32
Not only did Smith at all times, and with increasing vehemence,
assert his cross-sex orientation,'33 he also stressed that his actual or
perceived sexual orientation was irrelevant to his sex/gender
discrimination claim. 3 The defendant at all times agreed that Smith's
actual sexual orientation was irrelevant but insisted that its discriminatory
acts were motivated by, and targeted at, Smith's "suspected" sexual
orientation.'35 At both the trial and the appellate levels, the defendant
prevailed.
At the trial level the district court simply mis/re-characterized
Smith's actual and explicit framing of his effeminacy claim, accepting the
defendant's strategy of using his "suspected" sexual orientation to
eclipse, and ultimately exonerate, sex/gender discrimination.'36 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit effectively did the same despite Smith's insistent
framing of his claim to focus on sex/gender atypicality.'37 In Smith, as in
the subsequent sex/gender/sexual orientation cases, the defendants thus
devised explanations for their discriminatory actions that manipulated and
exploited a "sexual orientation loophole" to the anti-discrimination
129. See id. at 186-97 (observing the consequences of these rulings).
130. 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aft'd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
131. Valdes, Queers, supra note 3, at 139-40 (quoting discovery documents retrieved from
court records).
132. See id. at 14043 (summarizing the pleadings and claims).
133. See id. at 146 (noting the intensifying nature of Smith's position on this point).
134. See id. at 140 (framing the "sole" issue as sex/gender discrimination).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 142-51 (summarizing and critiquing the appellate opinion).
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mandate of Title VII law.138 In each instance, the courts rewarded that
strategy with exoneration of bigotries that targeted sex and gender
issues.139
Smith and its progeny therefore display how the textual omission of
"sexual orientation" from otherwise fairly comprehensive anti-
discrimination schemes can create a license for the practice of formally
outlawed discrimination. The omission of sexual orientation from federal
equality statutes thereby encourages not only the practice of heterosexism
but, under its cover, also the practice of androsexism. The ramifications
of that omission consequently extend across various anti-subordination
categories, communities, and constituencies.1 40
C. Race, Ethnicity, and Sexual Orientation: Beyond Intersectionality
The immediate point of concern for second-stage sexual orientation
theory is that, in all likelihood, a similar record of failure would result
from intersectional cases involving the combination of racism or
ethnocentrism and heterosexism. No reason exists for believing that
plaintiffs would be more successful in race/ethnicity and sexual
orientation cases than they have been in sex/gender and sexual orientation
cases. No reason exists for believing that defendants would restrain their
use of the sexual orientation loophole, as illustrated by the sex/gender
and sexual orientation cases, in analogous race/ethnicity and sexual
orientation cases. The experience thus far at the doctrinal intersection of
sex, gender, and sexual orientation suggests a similar adjudicative
scenario when race, ethnicity and sexual orientation intersect and are
challenged in the courts.
The record established by these cases therefore does not bode well
for cases involving a combination of racism, ethnocentrism and
heterosexism. Though intersectionality can help to illuminate the
interplay of white and heterosexist supremacy in social analysis, the
implication of sexual orientation in anti-discrimination claims under the
present configuration of federal law suggests a likely failure of doctrinal
intersectionality in federal litigation. The immediate observations, of
course, are the utility of intersectionality in social analysis and critical
138. See id. at 146-47 (discussing this "sexual orientation loophole" and its impact on
gender discrimination cases).
139. See id. at 153-69 (reviewing the subsequent Title VII rulings).
140. See id. at 205-06 (arguing a joint feminist and Queer interest in the interplay of
sexlgender and sexual orientation biases in these and similar cases).
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theorizing, as well as the doctrinal importance of formal or textual anti-
discrimination mandates; therefore, these observations underscore the
importance of securing such mandates for "sexual orientation"
discrimination at both federal and local levels."'
But under existing federal statutory and doctrinal circumstances, the
engagement of race and ethnicity in second-stage sexual orientation
scholarship must focus on devising means that go beyond a mere
extension of intersectionality and that are capable of alerting courts and
other legal decisionmakers to the interplay of biases based on this trio of
constructs. While continuing to employ intersectionality in social
analysis and legal theory, second stage scholarship must explore ways of
exposing and counteracting intersectionality's limited application in legal
analysis and doctrine. The development of tools and techniques that
permit and advance transformative legal analysis in light of sexual
orientation's formal vulnerability therefore is one of the key tasks
pending for the second stage of sexual orientation theorizing.
Fortunately, that effort already is incipient and promising. Sexual
minority scholars of color in recent years have begun to articulate
"multidimensionality"142 and "cosynthesis"143 to produce analytical
approaches or frameworks that go beyond intersectionality and that
therefore may be capable of responding to the unique scenarios that
implicate hybrid forms of sexual orientation bias. These efforts are a
first step toward a meaningful and empowering anti-subordination
141. As the history of struggle during the first-stage years illustrates, these mandates must
include both state and federal levels. See supra notes 20-49 and accompanying text (noting the
vicissitudes of first-stage anti-discrimination efforts in light of federal and state politics). State,
local, or private schemes therefore make it possible to test intersectional claims in state courts
under state or local laws. See supra notes 40 and 45 and authorities cited therein on state and
local issues; see also Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA
L. REv. 1687, 1701 (1997) (describing local private law arrangements that also provide
protection from sexual orientation bias).
142. See Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads,
supra note 15, at 432-33 (urging multidimensionality and indivisibility as useful anti-
subordination devices); Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Borders Engendered:
Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 920-26 (1997)
(further developing multidimensionality and indivisibility in the context of Latina/o legal
studies); Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 636-44 (also urging multidimensional anti-subordination
analyses).
143. See Kwan, supra note 15, at 1280-81 (introducing the concept of cosynthesis as an
analytical method that, like multidimensionality, goes beyond intersectionality).
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engagement of the racialized and ethnicized dimensions of sexual
orientation oppression.
To fully develop and operationalize these concepts, the second stage
of sexual orientation scholarship must conduct a critical conversation
about these and other analytical frameworks, a conversation informed by
the insights (and limits) of outsider jurisprudence. And to conduct this
critical and informed conversation, second-stage scholars must make and
honor a commitment to engage race and etnicity as integral components
of sexual orientation identities, interests, and issues. Finally, and as
urged above, this conversation can realize its highest productive potential
only if it is guided by an ethic of mutual and caring recognition."4 If
second-stage theorizing responds seriously to the emerging internal
critique, if it specifically explores multidimensionality or cosynthesis, and
if it exhibits an ethic of mutual and caring recognition in doing so, then
we will be able to look back on the coming years with pride.
Conclusion
This first-ever Symposium creates an opportune occasion to reflect
both on the emergence and progress of sexual minority scholarship since
the first sexual orientation symposium in 1979 and on the future depth
and direction of Queer legal theory. The first-stage accomplishments
include the assertion of a resolute and powerful critique of heterosexist
and androsexist supremacy in all walks of life, but first-stage
accomplishments also entailed the postponement of issues that matter
greatly to the diverse sexual minority communities that help to form this
scholarship's constituency. This Symposium therefore can help to draw
attention to pending issues, and to herald a more expansive and inclusive
agenda for a second stage of sexual orientation theorizing that is
consistent with the advent of Queer sensibilities, values and ethics in
sexual minority communities and discourses.
Among the pending issues is a thoroughgoing interrogation of race
and ethnicity in the law, theory, and politics of sexual orientation
community and subordination. Because lesbians, gay men, bisexuals,
and the trans/bi-gendered segments of sexual minority communities are
populated by both white and nonwhite persons, this interrogation is
indispensable to a complete critique of the permutated practices through
144. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (urging the cultivation of an ethic of
mutual and caring recognition among outsider scholars).
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which sexual orientation discrimination is practiced socially and legally.
And though the developmental circumstances of the first stage may help
explain a postponement of this interrogation, those circumstances no
longer can be invoked to continue a second-stage disengagement of the
racial and ethnic dimensions of sexual orientation communities and
concerns.
Thus, a continuing disengagement will be construed, and correctly
so, as a willful refusal to include in the sexual orientation equality agenda
the issues that complexify the lives of racial or ethnic minorities within
sexual minority communities-and beyond. That refusal would be
unfortunate and self-defeating for several reasons: it ignores the actual
diversities of sexual minority lives and interests, it limits the scope,
depth, and nuance of second-stage anti-subordination critiques, it
replicates historic patterns of injustice, it fosters division and contention
within and across various sectors of sexual minority communities, and it
squanders the opportunity to articulate and practice a progressive and
empowering ethic of caring recognition as we enter a second stage of
sexual orientation scholarship. For these substantive and strategic
reasons, second-stage scholars, theorists and activists mutually,
collectively, and proactively must engage the anti-subordination struggle
against white supremacy with a vigor and dedication equal to that shown
during the first stage against heterosexist supremacy.
To do so, however, second-stage theorizing must go beyond a mere
application of conventional intersectionality to race, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation. Though intersectional analyses are necessary to identify the
interlocked operation of white and heterosexist supremacy culturally, a
simple extension of intersectional analysis to anti-discrimination legal
issues that implicate sexual orientation is unworkable because the
doctrinal potency of intersectionality depends on the formal illegality of
all biases under inspection. Because sexual orientation prejudice is not
generally illegal, it does not generally lend itself to intersectionality's
doctrinal deployment. Thus, among the key tasks that await a second
stage of sexual orientation scholarship is the development of anti-
subordination tools and techniques that can account for race and ethnicity
in "sexual orientation" discrimination. Fortunately, that critical effort
seems already underway, but its progress and power will depend on a
sustained willingness and informed commitment among second-stage
theorists to take race and ethnicity seriously as integral components of the
"sexual orientation" anti-subordination struggle.
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